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I. INTRODUCTION
During an unprecedented Survey period defined by disruption, uncer-
tainty, and adaptation, Texas courts remained committed to precedent.
Despite necessary adjustments to court procedure in connection with the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the Texas judiciary continued to issue de-
cisions that emphasize freedom of contract, the importance of maintain-
ing good standing with the Texas Secretary of State, and that
contributions to a formal partnership may come in the form of not only
cash or physical assets but also services. If there is one collective
takeaway from Texas partnership cases during the Survey period, it is that
the actual words in joint venture agreements and other legal documents
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are given tremendous deference. Courts stressed the continued impor-
tance of careful drafting, acute regard for the minutia in service of pro-
cess, and scrupulous adherence to fiduciary duties. This Article is divided
into six sections that discuss cases concerning: (1) partnership formation;
(2) the powers of a limited partner; (3) personal jurisdiction; (4) forfei-
ture and involuntary termination; (5) indemnification; and (6) transfer of
a partnership interest.
II. PARTNERSHIP FORMATION
A. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
The question presented in Energy Transfer Partners v. Enterprise Prod-
ucts Partners1 is whether conditions precedent to the formation of a part-
nership may be enforced, even where the parties act as if they were in a
partnership. Ultimately, the Texas Supreme Court was guided by the
principle of freedom of contract in holding that Texas law may permit an
arrangement where no partnership exists unless and until certain condi-
tions precedent have been satisfied.2
The parties in dispute, Enterprise Products Partners, LP and Enterprise
Products Operating LLC as one group of parties (collectively, Enter-
prise), and Energy Transfer Partners, LP and Energy Transfer Fuel, LP as
the other group of parties (collectively, Energy Transfer), entered into
several written contracts under which the parties agreed that neither En-
terprise nor Energy Transfer would be committed to proceed in the pro-
posed venture until each of their respective board of directors formally
approved the contract.3 Over the next several months, Enterprise and
Energy Transfer pursued a pipeline project together, marketing such pro-
ject to potential customers as a “50/50” joint venture.4 Given that Enter-
prise and Energy Transfer were among the ten largest energy companies
in the United States at the time of the proposal, the project instilled ex-
pectations of considerable potential revenue.5 Ultimately, Enterprise de-
cided to end its relationship with Energy Transfer.6 Soon after, Enterprise
entered into another pipeline project with a new partner.7 Energy Trans-
fer sued, claiming Enterprise breached its duty of loyalty in connection
with a partnership the two formed to pursue the pipeline project.8 After
the jury sided with Energy Transfer, the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals
1. 593 S.W.3d 732, 733 (Tex. 2020).
2. Id. at 734, 742.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 735.
5. See id. at 734. Due to the emergence of new technologies, substantial oil produc-
tion in Canada and the northern United States created a glut of oil reserves with no effi-
cient route to refineries further south. See id. Enterprise and Energy Transfer sought to
capitalize on the situation by joining forces to convert an existing natural gas pipeline to
transport the oil, promising substantial returns for both. See id.
6. Id. at 736.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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reversed and Energy Transfer appealed.9
In its review of the case at issue, the supreme court applied the five-
factor statutory test to determinate the existence of a partnership as codi-
fied by the Texas Business Organizations Code and further laid out in
Ingram v. Deere.10 Pursuant to the Ingram doctrine, the following five
factors indicate the existence of a partnership: (1) the “right to receive a
share of profits”; (2) intent to become a partnership; (3) the “right to
participate in control”; (4) an agreement to share losses or liability for
third-party claims; and (5) “contributing or agreeing to contribute money
or property to the alleged partnership.”11 To supplement its analysis, the
supreme court further reflected on Ingram, in which it doubted the legis-
lature “intended to spring surprise or accidental partnerships on indepen-
dent business persons.”12 However, unlike Ingram, the case at hand
presented the question of whether the parties could negate the five-factor
test laid out above by intentionally agreeing not to form a partnership
unless certain conditions are met.13
Energy Transfer argued that the parties’ intent to form a legal partner-
ship is just one factor to be considered within the five-factor test, and that
the other factors demonstrated that a partnership had been formed.14
Conversely, Enterprise stressed the fundamental principles of freedom of
contract and law and equity—that if the parties did not intend to form a
partnership, then such intent should have significant sway as to the issue
of whether a partnership had been formed.15 The supreme court was
favorable to Enterprise’s public policy argument.16 The supreme court
further supported its stance by noting that Texas courts remain true to the
principle of freedom of contract by regularly “reject[ing] legal claims that
are artfully pleaded to skirt unambiguous contract language.”17
The supreme court’s holding in Energy Transfer should serve as an op-
portunity for counsel to carefully draft contracts to express the intent of
the parties, especially where the parties seek to avoid the unintentional
9. Id. at 736–37.
10. Id. at 737.
11. Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 895 (Tex. 2009) (stating that, under the Texas
Revised Partnership Act, courts should evaluate the totality of the circumstances, “with no
single factor being either necessary or sufficient to prove the existence of a partnership”).
12. Energy Transfer Partners, 593 S.W.3d at 738 (quoting Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 898).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 740.
15. See id.
16. Id. The supreme court underscored the primacy of this public policy rationale
throughout its jurisprudence by quoting the nineteenth century British judge, Sir George
Jessel,
[i]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is
that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost lib-
erty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.
Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are
not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.
Id. at 738 (citing Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel, 238 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1951)).
17. Id.
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formation of a partnership. Counsel would be wise to pay special atten-
tion to clauses involving waiver or modification of such conditions prece-
dent to partnership formation, in order to ensure no accidental waiver of
the no-partnership clause occurs.
B. SWEAT EQUITY
GR Fabrication, LLC v. Swan is a reminder of the core purpose of
partnerships—to bring two spheres of expertise or contribution together
to create a stronger business entity.18 Longtime associates, Grant Swartz-
welder and Randy Swan, came to a disagreement as to the nature of their
business arrangement when Swan claimed the two were acting as a part-
nership, and Swartzwelder insisted Swan was merely an employee. To
Swartzwelder’s point, Swan was employed and salaried by OTA Com-
pression, LLC, a limited liability company majority owned by Swartzwel-
der.19 However, after considerable conflicting testimony from the parties,
the trial court jury found that Swartzwelder was in breach of a de jure
partnership with Swan, awarding Swan damages and attorney’s fees.20
Swartzwelder filed the instant appeal, contending among other things
that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s find-
ings.21 In reviewing Swan’s claim that a partnership had been formed
(and therefore breached), the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals ap-
plied the facts to the five-factor test set forth in § 152.052(a) of the Texas
Business Organizations Code and the Ingram doctrine, as delineated in
this article’s discussion of Energy Transfer above.22
Of the five factors, profit sharing and participation in control have
proven to be the most dominant in determining whether a partnership
exists.23 With respect to profit sharing, Swan presented evidence that it
was his and Swartzwelder’s practice to split profits for each transaction.24
In response, Swartzwelder presented a far different version of the ar-
rangement, maintaining that no profits were ever split and that Swan was
fairly compensated as a salaried employee.25 Notably, the court empha-
sized that the mere fact that Swan was an employee did not preclude him
from also being in a partnership with his employer.26 As such, the court
determined the jury could have reasonably believed that such a profit-
18. See GR Fabrication, L.L.C. v. Swan, No. 02-19-00242-CV, 2020 WL 2202325, at *1,
*8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
19. Id. at *1–2.
20. Id. at *3.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *4–8.
23. Id. at *4, *7.
24. Id. at *1. Swan’s testimony centered around a series of “handshake” agreements
and a repeated course of conduct in which Swartzwelder would purchase used oil and gas
equipment, Swan would refurbish it, and the equipment would be resold for a profit with
the proceeds split equally between the two men. Id.
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id. at *4.
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sharing arrangement did exist.27
As to participation in control and contributions to the business, Swartz-
welder argued that each transaction was routed through GR Fabrication,
LLC (GR Fabrication), a limited liability company wholly owned by
Swartzwelder.28 Although Swartzwelder’s sole control of GR Fabrication
contributed to the appellate court’s decision, it was not dispositive. The
appellate court explained that the division of control (or control in sepa-
rate spheres of authority) “does not necessarily indicate” there is a lack
of joint control.29 While Swartzwelder contributed financially to the part-
nership, Swan contributed significant “sweat equity” (or services) “in
buying, refurbishing, and marketing the equipment” that was the subject
of the partnership.30 In this case, the lack of a written contract between
the parties did not diminish the possibility that the business associates
intended to create a partnership whereby Swartzwelder would contribute
the funds and Swan would manage the day-to-day operations of the
venture.31
After examining the totality of the circumstances, the appellate court
concluded the majority of the five factors favored the existence of a part-
nership between Swartzwelder and Swan.32 This case demonstrates that
Texas courts are conscious of the importance of services (sweat equity)
contributed to a partnership, as opposed to merely valuing financial con-
tributions, and that the ambiguity created by informal “handshake”
agreements underscores the gravity of not committing such arrangements
to writing.
III. POWERS OF LIMITED PARTNERS
During a Survey period in which domestic and international travel
were heavily restricted, the circumstances leading to the dispute in Great
Southwest Regional Center, LLC v. ACSWD, LP33 remind practitioners
that while foreign investment through government sponsorship programs
can provide much needed influx of seemingly easy capital, the rudimen-
tary rules of thoughtful drafting still apply.
Under the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) EB-5 pro-
gram, foreign investors may obtain a permanent resident card (often re-
ferred to colloquially as a “green card”) by making a certain capital
investment in a U.S. business that creates at least ten jobs.34 Great South-
west Regional Center, LLC (Great Southwest) sponsored one such pro-
ject involving salt water disposal wells and formed a new entity
27. Id. at *5.
28. Id. at *7.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *8.
31. See id. at *6–7.
32. Id. at *8.
33. No. 14-18-00679-CV, 2020 WL 205993, at*1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan.
14, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
34. Id.
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(ACSWD) that would offer a limited partnership interest in exchange for
such a monetary investment.35
Lu Jun, a foreign citizen seeking to participate in USCIS’s EB-5 pro-
gram, agreed to invest in ACSWD.36 After signing ACSWD’s partnership
agreement and wiring the appropriate funds to Great Southwest, Jun be-
came the sole limited partner in the partnership, holding a 99% interest.37
Pursuant to the ACSWD partnership agreement and an accompanying
private placement offering memorandum, all of the EB-5 program invest-
ments would be loaned to 3:16 Disposal Systems, Series LLC (3:16) for
the purpose of funding 3:16’s management of the salt water disposal facil-
ities.38 At least some of the EB-5 funds were instead loaned to Frost
Rains Holdings, LLC (Frost), which was the sole member of Great South-
west, ACSWD’s general partner.39 In January 2015, Jun requested a re-
fund of the amounts she had wired to ACSWD, which was subsequently
denied.40
At the time, Great Southwest was involved in an underlying dispute
with the company it had used to locate foreign investors for the salt water
disposal wells project.41 Jun filed a plea in intervention, seeking a return
of her investment in ACSWD.42 The opposing parties involved in the un-
derlying dispute, including Great Southwest, filed a motion to dismiss
Jun’s claim on the grounds that she lacked standing pursuant to an assign-
ment of claims she had executed.43 In response, Jun asserted that, in her
capacity as the sole limited partner of ACSWD, she had removed Great
Southwest as ACSWD’s general partner and had appointed SWD Invest-
ment Recovery Fund, LLC (SWD Investment) as the replacement gen-
eral partner.44 The trial court entered a judgment affirming Jun’s
actions.45 Having thus gained court approved control over ACSWD, Jun
nonsuited her claims against ACSWD, thereafter causing ACSWD to file
its own intervention asserting claims of “breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duties, and fraudulent transfer” against each of Great South-
west, Frost, and Frost’s primary principles, Robert Frost and Kenneth






40. See id. at *2. The opinion of the appellate court did not specify Jun’s reason for
requesting the refund, although it was presumably related to the EB-5 funds being loaned
to Frost and used to pay down car loans and credit card bills instead of being loaned to 3:16
for the purpose of investing in salt water disposal wells as specified in the limited partner-
ship agreement and private placement offering memorandum. See id. at *5.




45. Id. at *2–3.
46. Id. at *2.
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case with ACSWD as the sole plaintiff.47
In its appeal, Great Southwest contended, inter alia, that the trial court
had misinterpreted ACSWD’s partnership agreement by approving Jun’s
removal of Great Southwest as general partner of ACSWD and the ap-
pointment of SWD Investment to that role.48 Great Southwest relied on
isolated portions of the partnership agreement that stated the admission
of another entity as a new general partner required the consent of a ma-
jority interest of the current limited partners and that of the current gen-
eral partner.49 Given that no general partner existed at the time of the
appointment, Great Southwest argued no valid admission could have
been made.50
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals disagreed with Great
Southwest’s contention, instead construing the partnership agreement as
a whole.51 The court reasoned that the partnership agreement undeniably
stated that “limited partners owning at least 75% of the limited partners’
interest can . . . remove the general partner with or without cause” and
can appoint a successor general partner.52 As Jun’s limited partnership
interest exceeded this threshold, her actions were valid under the partner-
ship agreement.53 The court of appeals supported this interpretation by
noting that specific provisions (including the threshold amount of inter-
ests described above) should control over broad concepts in the agree-
ment.54 As in Energy Transfer, mindful counsel will take away a drafting
lesson from Great Southwest and be careful to ensure the client can rely
on specific clauses of a partnership agreement, especially where such
clauses may conflict with more general provisions.
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Hanschen v. Hanschen55 is a cautionary tale regarding the necessity of
careful wording—not only in a petition, but also in the accompanying
citation of service. James Hanschen served as trustee of the Vier Sohne
Progeny Trust (the Trust), which served as manager of NBR-C2, LLC and
NBR-C3, LLC (collectively, NBR-C), and as general partner of NBR-
Needham 2 Partnership (NBR-N, and collectively with NBR-C, the Com-
panies).56 James’s relatives, David Hanschen, Michael Hanschen, and
47. Id. Having been rebuffed in the attempt to regain her initial $500,000 investment,
Jun, as the 99% interest holder and sole limited partner of ACSWD, wrested control of the
organization from Great Southwest and pressed on with the lawsuit in ACSWD’s capacity
after bowing out as a litigant in her personal capacity. See id.
48. Id. at *6.





54. Id. at *9.
55. No. 05-19-01134-CV, 2020 WL 2764629, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 28, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
56. See id.
192 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 7
Ryan Hanschen (collectively, the Family), brought suit against James for
misapplication of funds and failure to provide an accounting in regards to
both the Trust and the Companies.57 The Family also sought punitive
damages against James for breach of fiduciary duties in each of the
above-referenced actions.58
On March 29, 2019, while attending a meeting in Texas related to the
Trust, James was personally served with the Family’s petition and cita-
tion.59 The petition was comprehensively styled “James Hanschen, indi-
vidually and in his capacity as the trustee of the Vier Sohne Progeny
Trust, former manager of NBR-C2, LLC and NBR-C3 LLC, and former
general partner of NBR-Needham 2 Partnership.”60 However, the accom-
panying citation of service merely stated it was directed towards “James
Hanschen wherever he may be found.”61
After being served with the petition and citation, James failed to re-
spond by the answer deadline as required by Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 99(b).62 On May 24, 2019, the trial court granted the Family’s
motion for default judgment, entered against James in both his individual
capacity and in his capacity as a representative of the Trust and the Com-
panies, respectively.63 Nearly a month after the entry of default, James
made a special appearance to request the default be set aside and a new
trial be granted.64 The trial court granted James’s special appearance and
the Family appealed.65
In evaluating the Family’s appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision to
grant James’s special appearance, the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals
looked first to the adequacy of service on James in his individual capacity
and then to the adequacy of service on him in his representative
capacities.66
Citing the U.S. Supreme Court, the appellate court referenced the na-
tion’s time-honored tradition of recognizing a defendant’s physical pres-
ence as a sole basis for personal jurisdiction.67 James did not contest the
fact that he was personally served, preferring to sidestep the issue entirely
by asserting that no cause of action was brought against him in his per-




60. Id. at *3 n.4.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id. at *1 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 99(b) requires a “defendant to file a written
answer to the plaintiff’s petition on or before 10:00 a.m. on the Monday next after the
expiration of twenty days after the date of service thereof.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 99(b).
63. Hanschen, 2020 WL 2764629, at *1.
64. See id. A special appearance is an initial filing by a defendant challenging the
court’s jurisdiction and is required to be made before any other pleadings or motions. TEX.
R. CIV. P. 120(a)(1).
65. See Hanschen, 2020 WL 2764629, at *1.
66. Id. at *2–3.
67. Id. at *2 (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990)).
68. Id.
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the allegations for breach of fiduciary duty through the lens of tort law, it
posited “Texas’ longstanding rule that a corporate agent is personally lia-
ble for his own fraudulent or tortious acts.”69
Having made short work of the first issue, the court next turned to the
issue of representative capacity, where it took a more nuanced approach.
Acknowledging the adequacy of the petition, the court demurred as to
the citation, taking aim at both its substance and the return of service
memorializing its delivery.70 First, the court reasoned that the petition
and citation require direct parity—if the petition is styled against an indi-
vidual in his personal capacity and his representative capacity, then the
citation should reflect the same.71 Second, the court took issue with the
return of service that mirrored the citation in stating simply that service
was accomplished on “James Hanschen” without regard to his represen-
tative capacities on behalf of the Trust and the Companies.72 The court
was exacting in its application of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure re-
garding such service, logically concluding that any fault in service of pro-
cess defeats a court’s personal jurisdiction and thus voids any subsequent
default judgment.73 In justifying this harsh result, the court cited long-
settled Texas precedent that “actions taken by an individual in a repre-
sentative capacity are separate and distinct from actions taken in an indi-
vidual’s personal capacity.”74
Proper service of process is a crucial element to “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”75 The rules governing this element of
due process are succinct, and Texas courts are unforgiving of even the
slightest deviations. Practitioners would be well advised to pay careful
attention during the opening salvo of litigation and be fastidious in their
drafting of both the petition and the citation of service.
V. FORFEITURE AND INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION
Breakwater Advanced Manufacturing, LLC v. East Texas Machine
Works, Inc.76 ruminates on the varying personal liability implications for
members of a limited liability company whose charter is forfeited in vari-
ous jurisdictions—and on the importance of clearly and conclusively es-
tablishing the date of such forfeiture for the Twelfth Tyler Court of
Appeals’s benefit.
This case centers on a payment dispute for machining services provided
by East Texas Machine Works, Inc. (ETM) to Breakwater Advanced
69. Id. (citing Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. 2002)).
70. Id. at *3.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(a); Lytle v. Cunningham, 261 S.W.3d 837, 840 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).
74. Hanschen, 2020 WL 2764629, at *3 (citing Stauffer v. Nicholson, 438 S.W.3d 205,
212 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.)).
75. See id. at *2 (quoting Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990)).
76. No. 12-19-00013-CV, 2020 WL 827139, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 19, 2020, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
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Manufacturing, LLC (Breakwater).77 The key facts of the case are: (1)
ETM provided machining services to Breakwater in December 2015 and
January 2016;78 (2) invoices for those services, totaling $31,800.00, were
timely sent by ETM to Breakwater and clearly set forth payment terms of
net thirty days, subject to accrual of interest at the maximum legal rate if
not timely paid within that time;79 (3) Breakwater eventually paid the
$31,800.00 during the pendency of the suit, but not the accrued interest;80
(4) Breakwater’s corporate charter was forfeited in January 2017;81 and
(5) at the time of such forfeiture, Mark Leach, Bryan Benoit, and Greg
David were each shareholders of Breakwater.82
ETM brought suit on an account83 and for breach of contract to which
Breakwater filed a general denial and sought reimbursement for attor-
ney’s fees and litigation costs.84 Among ETM’s allegations were that
Leach, Benoit, and David were each individually liable for damages pur-
suant to § 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code, “based upon [Breakwater’s]
continued failure to file a franchise tax return in May 2016 and pay taxes
which were incurred and due for the tax year 2015.”85 In support of this
assertion, ETM attached a notice of forfeiture from the Texas secretary of
state effective as of January 27, 2017, setting forth the following findings:
1. The [s]ecretary has received certification from the [c]omptroller
of [p]ublic [a]ccounts under Section 171.302 of the Texas Tax Code
indicating that there are grounds for the forfeiture of the taxable en-
tity’s charter, certificate or registration; and
2. The comptroller of [p]ublic [a]ccounts has determined that the
taxable entity has not revived its forfeited privileges within 120 days
after the date that the privileges were forfeited.86
Lastly, ETM also included a public information report showing each of
Leach, Benoit, and David as members of Breakwater for the 2015 report-
ing year.87
After the parties were unsuccessful in reaching a settlement agreement,
Breakwater filed both traditional and no evidence motions for summary
judgment.88 ETM responded to the motions and subsequently filed its
own motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted, award-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *1–2. (noting that appellants “failed to file a verified denial pursuant to Rule
93 of the rules of civil procedure as required to dispute the receipt of the services or cor-
rectness of the charges in a suit on a sworn account.”).
80. Id. at *1.
81. Id. at *2.
82. See id.
83. Sometimes referred to as a “suit on sworn account,” this is a procedural tool under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 185 for establishing a plaintiff’s prima facie right of recovery
on certain types of accounts, such as the one in this case. TEX. R. CIV. P. 185.
84. Breakwater, 2020 WL 827139, at *1.
85. Id. at *7.
86. Id. at *7–8.
87. Id. at *8.
88. Id. at *1.
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ing $1,895.63 in interest and $12,000.00 in attorney’s fees jointly and sev-
erally against Breakwater and each of its shareholders.89 The instant
appeal followed, contesting, among other things, the individual liability of
Leach, Benoit, and David as shareholders on the premise that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Breakwater was in forfeiture
status at the time the cause of action accrued.90
The court began its analysis with a citation to the actual words of the
statute in question:
Section 171.255 states as follows:
(a) If the corporate privileges of a corporation are forfeited for
the failure to file a report or pay a tax or penalty, each director
or officer of the corporation is liable for each debt of the cor-
poration that is created or incurred in this state after the date
on which the report, tax, or penalty is due and before the cor-
porate privileges are revived. The liability includes liability for
any tax or penalty imposed by this chapter on the corporation
that becomes due and payable after the date of the forfeiture.
(b) The liability of a director or officer is in the same manner and
to the same extent as if the director or officer were a partner
and the corporation were a partnership.91
The court of appeals then noted that its sister courts are split as to the
exact moment personal liability attaches in relation to the date of the
forfeiture.92 Some Texas appellate courts have held that personal liability
does not attach for obligations entered into before the forfeiture actually
occurs,93 whereas others have held that such personal liability attaches at
any point after the failure to file a report, or pay a tax or penalty that led
to the forfeiture, but before corporate privileges are restored.94
Hewing closely to the literal words of the statute, the appellate court
concluded that after a forfeiture occurs, personal liability becomes retro-
actively effective from the moment the underlying tax, report, or penalty
becomes past due.95 Despite this interpretation, the appellate court was
still unwilling to uphold the trial court’s summary judgment imparting
personal liability because the evidence submitted by ETM did not specify
the date upon which Breakwater became delinquent under its Chapter
171 obligations.96 Because there was no such date in the record to which
such personal liability could relate back to, the court concluded that a
89. Id.
90. Id. at *7.
91. Id. (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a)–(b)).
92. See id. at *8.
93. Id.; see Serna v. State, 877 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, writ denied).
94. Breakwater, 2020 WL 827139, at *8; see In re Trammell, 246 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); see also Dae Won Choe v. Chancellor, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 740,
743 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ).
95. Breakwater, 2020 WL 827139, at *8 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255). In
other words, while it may take the secretary of state several months to effectuate the forfei-
ture, it will still relate back to the underlying cause for purposes of creating personal liabil-
ity of the organization’s principals.
96. Id. at *9.
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genuine issue of material fact existed on this point, and thus remanded
the case back to the trial court for further consideration.97
Lawyers and clients alike should always be vigilant in maintaining cor-
porate filing and tax obligations. However, lawyers also need to be aware
that a failure to do so can impart personal liability to vastly different de-
grees based solely on the jurisdiction in which a subsequent action is
brought. Depending on which side of the petition the parties sit, a careful
choice of venue could create a substantial difference in any eventual re-
covery based on a corporate charter’s forfeiture and the resultant share-
holder’s personal liability. Frankly, an even more important guideline is
to caution clients not to allow their entities to lose their corporate charter
and risk personal liability in the first place.
VI. INDEMNIFICATION
Equine Holdings, LLC v. Jacoby98 stresses the importance of careful
drafting of indemnity provisions and serves as a stark reminder that Texas
courts give maximum effect to parties’ freedom of contract while strictly
enforcing the plain meaning of the language employed.
In December 2016, Michael Jacoby and his wife obtained a 10% inter-
est in eQuine Holdings, LLC (eQuine), in exchange for a $100,000.00
loan to Brent Atwood, a member of eQuine.99 The remaining interests
were owned 70% by Atwood and 20% by John C. Cooley III.100 To effec-
tuate the transfer of such 10% interest in eQuine by Atwood to Jacoby,
the members of eQuine amended its Limited Liability Company Articles
of Organization, to include the following provision related to
indemnification:
The Company shall indemnify any person who was or is a party de-
fendant or is threatened to be made a party defendant, pending or
completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, admin-
istrative, or investigation (other than an action by or in the right of
the Company) by reason of the fact that he is or was a Member of
the Company, Manager, employee or agent of the Company, or is or
was serving at the request of the Company, for instant expenses (in-
cluding attorney’s fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settle-
ment actually and reasonably incurred in connection with such
action, suit or proceeding if the Members representing 81% or more
of the capital interest in the Company as described in Exhibit 2 de-
termine that he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest of the Company
. . . .101
97. Id.
98. No. 05-19-00758-CV, 2020 WL 2079183, at 1* (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2020,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
99. Id.
100. Id. at *5.
101. Id. at *2 (first emphasis added).
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Jacoby thereafter served as eQuine’s chief operating officer “evaluating
private-equity opportunities and soliciting new investors for the
company.”102
Within a year, eQuine, Atwood, and Jacoby became defendants in a
suit by Thomas Schmidt for, inter alia, defamation and misappropriation
of trade secrets.103 Of particular import, the action against Jacoby was
styled in his capacity “as an employee, affiliate, or partner of eQuine.”104
EQuine’s members approved and subsequently paid Atwood’s and
Jacoby’s attorney fees from October 2017 to April 2018.105 The payments
came to a halt in 2018 when Atwood, on behalf of eQuine, refused to
continue paying Jacoby’s attorney fees.106 Thereafter, Jacoby provided
for his own legal defense and brought an action for breach of the indem-
nification agreement.107 EQuine responded with a challenge under the
Texas Citizens Participation Act, an Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Pub-
lic Participation (SLAPP) statute, but failed to deny Jacoby’s pleading
that he had performed all conditions precedent to the suit.108 The trial
court eventually ruled in Jacoby’s favor, awarding him attorney’s fees and
costs.109
In the instant appeal, Atwood raised for the first time a challenge to
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Jacoby’s indem-
nity claims were premature.110 Taking up the issue of ripeness de novo,
the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals took note of eQuine’s failure to attack
Jacoby’s averment that he had performed all conditions precedent to
bringing suit and moved to consider the matter of jurisdiction in this
light—i.e., that Jacoby had hired counsel, incurred legal expenses, and
sought reimbursement.111 Citing the Texas Supreme Court in Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp.,112 the appellate court expounded on
the differences between an indemnity for liabilities versus a claim for at-
torney’s fees.113
In Ingersoll-Rand, the supreme court explained that ordinarily “[a]n







108. See id. The Anti-SLAPP statute provides a cause of action against baseless claims
meant to harass or intimidate. See id. at *6. The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals did not
address the Anti-SLAPP statute claim here because Jacoby presented a prima facie case
for each element of the breach of contract claim with clear and specific evidence which
eQuine failed to contest—thus proving a valid basis for Jacoby’s suit and undercutting any
assertion it was brought to harass or intimidate. See id.
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. Because no judgment can stand if a court does not have authority to issue it,
subject matter jurisdiction can always be raised on appeal, even if the issue was not raised
in a lower court. Id.
111. Id.
112. 997 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
113. Equine Holdings, LLC, 2020 WL 2079183, at *3.
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ties become fixed and certain” and therefore may never come to fruition
depending on the outcome of a case.114 By comparison, attorney’s fees
are a foregone conclusion at the instant legal representation is re-
tained.115 Applying Ingersoll-Rand, the appellate court reasoned that the
plain language of the indemnity provision provided that payment of at-
torney’s fees was not contingent upon a specific outcome of the suit, but
was instead predicated upon immediate accrual of the fees as “instant
expenses.”116 Because Jacoby established he incurred attorney’s fees,
made demand for payment of such fees from eQuine, and was subse-
quently denied, his claim for indemnification did not rest upon a final
judgment and was ripe for the court’s consideration.117
Indemnification provisions are especially deserving of careful thought
and scrupulous attention to word choice. Lawyers and their clients should
be mindful of phrasing in crafting such provisions—the difference be-
tween a valid indemnity and no indemnity at all is often decided by just a
few select words.
VII. TRANSFER OF A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
Metromarke Multifamily Development Fund I, LP v. RRAC Develop-
ment GP, LLC118 further emphasizes Texas’s public policy of strict inter-
pretation of contract terms and the grave and unintended consequences
that can follow from broadly drafted indemnity provisions. The dispute in
this case arose over a buy-sell provision in a limited partnership agree-
ment (the Partnership Agreement) among RRAC Development GP,
LLC (RRAC) which held a one-tenth percent interest as general partner,
Metromarke Multifamily Development Fund I, LP (Metromarke), which
held a ninety percent interest as a limited partner, and GFD Market Rate
Group I, LLC (GFD), holding the remaining interest as a limited
partner.119
Section 13.1 of the Partnership Agreement contained the buy-sell pro-
vision at issue. The provision specified that any partner could issue a
“Buy-Out Notice” to any other partner, essentially forcing that partner to
choose between selling their own interest in the partnership or buying the
issuing partner’s interest.120 The buy-sell provision further provided that
“[t]he interest being conveyed shall be transferred free and clear [of] any
and all Claims, and shall include an indemnity from the Partner convey-
ing its interest in a form acceptable to the Partner acquiring such
interest.”121
114. Ingersoll-Rand, 997 S.W.2d at 210.
115. Id.
116. Equine Holdings, LLC, 2020 WL 2079183, at *3.
117. Id.





2021] Partnership Law 199
In July 2016, Metromarke filed suit against RRAC over an alleged
breach of the Partnership Agreement in an attempt to remove RRAC as
the general partner.122 During the pendency of the lawsuit, Metromarke
delivered a Buy-Out Notice to RRAC, and RRAC elected to purchase
Metromarke’s interest in the Partnership and delivered to Metromarke a
proposed buy-out agreement containing an indemnity.123 Metromarke re-
sponded to RRAC with a modified indemnity provision carving out any
claims related to the lawsuit.124 In response, RRAC and GFD filed coun-
terclaims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment over the modi-
fied form of the indemnity agreement.125
After a lengthy four-day bench trial, the trial court found in favor of
RRAC, awarding RRAC and GFD $2,764,555.00 in damages, ordering
Metromarke to sell its interest in the partnership to RRAC for
$3,311,468.01 (less any offsets from the award of damages), and requiring
Metromarke to provide an accompanying indemnity to RRAC in an ac-
ceptable form.126 Adding to the stinging judgment, the trial court further
provided for a future award of attorney’s fees should Metromarke file a
subsequent unsuccessful appeal.127 Despite the looming threat of in-
creased liability, Metromarke appealed.128
At the trial court, RRAC argued that the Partnership Agreement’s
terms, when taken literally, necessitated the lawsuit being swept into the
scope of the buy-sell provision’s indemnity agreement.129 On appeal, Me-
tromarke responded by characterizing RRAC’s position as a “get-out-of-
jail-free card” and stressed that the intent of the disputed indemnity pro-
vision was to provide protection from competing claims of ownership in
relation to “the interest being conveyed—not legal claims having nothing
to do with ownership of that interest.”130
In evaluating the parties’ arguments, the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals
acknowledged a court’s duty to construe contract provisions in such a way
so as to effectuate the parties’ intent.131 However, it also stressed the im-
portance of reaching that intent by looking only to the plain language and
generally accepted meaning of the words those parties chose to use in
crafting their agreement.132 The court further cited precedent specific to
indemnity agreements, saying that they ought to be “strictly construed,
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Despite the disagreement over the indemnity language, the parties did agree




128. See id. at *1.
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id. at *2 (citing Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d
882, 888 (Tex. 2019)).
132. Id.
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pursuant to the usual principles of contract interpretation.”133 Armed
with these principles, the court turned to the four corners of the Partner-
ship Agreement itself, pointing to the expansive definition of a “claim”
which included “any and all claims, . . . suits, proceedings, actions or
causes of action of any kind or character whatsoever, whether at law, in
equity, by statute or otherwise, whether known, unknown, suspected or
unsuspected.”134
Thus, the court reasoned that the claims contained in the lawsuit were
precisely the kind contemplated by the buy-sell provision and were di-
rectly related to the ownership interest at issue.135 The court concluded
that by the Partnership Agreement’s straightforward terms, Metromarke
had agreed to indemnify RRAC against every claim brought in the origi-
nal lawsuit and accordingly affirmed the trial court’s judgment.136
Just as a careful selection of words can mean the difference between a
valid indemnity and no indemnity at all, the well-meaning use of over
inclusive definitions can have painful ramifications. The intense fallout
from the loose language used in the Partnership Agreement should be a
clarion call for practitioners to be mindful of using “catch-all” boilerplate
language when judicious wordsmithing would be better suited to crucial
provisions like indemnities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The body of law represented by these cases continues to articulate the
basic truth of the legal profession—attention to detail remains a subtle
but indispensable skill in practicing the craft. Whether applied to crucial
risk-shifting agreements, foundational operating documents, or the sim-
plest service of process citations, lawyers and clients alike cannot afford
to fall victim to drowsy drafting. Texas’s public policies emphasizing free-
dom of contract and the parties’ bargained-for exchange can exact a
heavy toll on careless practitioners and their clients. The world-wide
events over the course of the Survey period highlight the importance of
safety, carefulness, and precaution. Texas courts over the Survey period
followed suit with these lessons by presenting cautionary tales in connec-
tion with careless drafting. Moving forward, counsel should continue to
monitor developments in Texas partnership law to keep their edge honed.
133. Id. (citing E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 259 S.W.3d 800, 805
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)).
134. Id. at *3, *5 n.2.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id. at *3, *5.
